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Abstract 
Background: Loss of empathy is an early central symptom and diagnostic criterion of 
the behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). Although changes in 
empathy are evident and strongly affect the social functioning of bvFTD patients, few 
studies have directly investigated this issue by means of experimental paradigms. The 
current study assessed multiple components of empathy (affective, cognitive and 
moral) in bvFTD patients. We also explored whether the loss of empathy constitutes a 
primary deficit of bvFTD or whether it is explained by impairments in executive 
functions (EF) or other social cognition domains. 
Methods: Thirty-seven bvFTD patients with early/mild stages of the disease and 30 
healthy control participants were assessed with a task that involves the perception of 
intentional and accidental harm. Participants were also evaluated on emotion 
recognition, theory of mind (ToM), social norms knowledge and several EF domains.  
Results: BvFTD patients presented deficits in affective, cognitive and moral 
components of empathy. However, empathic concern was the only aspect primarily 
affected in bvFTD that was neither related nor explained by deficits in EF or other 
social cognition domains. Deficits in the cognitive and moral aspects of empathy 
seem to depend on EF, emotion recognition and ToM.  
Conclusions: Our findings highlight the importance of using tasks depicting real-life 
social scenarios because of their greater sensitivity in the assessment of bvFTD. 
Moreover, our results contribute to the understanding of primary and intrinsic 








Loss of empathy is an early symptom of behavioral variant of frontotemporal 
dementia (bvFTD) and constitutes one of its diagnostic criteria (1, 2). Patients with 
bvFTD display a diminished response to other’s feelings and a diminished social 
interest or personal warmth (3, 4). From a clinical perspective, empathy changes 
influence the interpersonal judgment, emotions, behavior, and social functioning of 
bvFTD patients (1, 2, 5). In spite of its relevance, the study of empathy in bvFTD 
patients using experimental designs has been scarce, and no studies have explored 
whether relevant factors (6, 7) such as executive functions (EF) and other social 
cognition domains (OSCD) impact the empathic abilities of these patients.  
 
The current study assessed multiple empathy aspects in bvFTD patients using an 
experimental paradigm of empathy for pain that has been previously validated with 
behavioral measures, eye-tracking and fMRI (8). Moreover, we explored whether 
empathy deficits constitute a primary symptom of bvFTD or whether they are 
secondary to EF or OSCD impairments. 
 
Empathy is essential for human social interaction, comprising the capacity to share 
and understand the subjective experience of others in reference to oneself (9). This 
complex construct involves (1) affective components: sharing and responding to the 
emotional experience of others (10); (2) cognitive components: understanding the 
intentions and perspectives of others; and (3) moral components: judging the actions 
of a perpetrator or the punishment deserved (8, 9).  
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In spite of the complexity of empathy, traditional approaches to measure it have relied 
on self-report questionnaires. These questionnaires do not allow appropriate 
measurements (they consider empathy as a trait) and do not fully represent empathic 
abilities because of their limited ecological validity (11). Most studies of empathy 
with bvFTD patients (3, 5, 12, 13) have employed self-report questionnaires, 
evidencing impairments in affective and cognitive components. 
 
We implemented a novel paradigm with naturalistic stimuli that measures empathy 
for other’s physical pain. This type of paradigm has been widely used due to the 
robustness of pain in inducing empathic responses (14) and the well characterized 
neural circuit of empathy (15). The empathy for pain task (EPT) employed here (16, 
17) evaluates empathy in the context of intentional/accidental harms and consists of 
three different scenarios: (1) intentional or (2) accidental harms in which one person 
is in a painful situation intentionally or accidentally caused by another, and (3) neutral 
or control situations. The EPT evaluates the following components: (A) 
comprehension of the accidental or deliberate nature of the action and the intention of 
the perpetrator to hurt (cognitive components), (B) the empathic concern and the 
degree of discomfort for the victim (affective components), (C) the correctness of the 
action and punishment for the perpetrator (moral components). 
 
Executive functions and OSCD seem to affect Individual differences in empathy(18, 
19) as well as in emotion processing (18), ToM (19) and moral cognition (8) have 
been linked to empathy. Indeed, neuroimaging studies (18) show overlapped brain 
regions among these processes. It is well known that both EF (6, 20, 21) and social 
cognition (22, 23) are impaired in bvFTD, but there are no studies exploring whether 
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and how these factors affect the empathic abilities these patients. This study assessed 
multiple empathy components in bvFTD patients by using an experimental paradigm 
involving ecological validity. We also employed several EF and OSCD (emotion 
recognition, ToM, and social norms knowledge) sensitive measures for bvFTD 
assessment. Finally, we explored whether empathy deficits constitute a primary 
symptom of bvFTD or if they are an EF or OSCD impairments consequence. 
 




Thirty-seven patients fulfilled the Lund and Manchester criteria (24) and the revised 
criteria for probable bvFTD (2) (see details regarding phenocopies or differential 
diagnoses in S1). Patients presented with prominent changes in personality and social 
behavior as verified by caregivers. Diagnosis was made by a group of experts in 
bvFTD. Patients underwent a standard examination battery including neurological, 
neuropsychiatric and neuropsychological assessments and a routine MRI. All patients 
were in early/mild stages of the disease and did not meet the criteria for specific 
psychiatric disorders. Patients presenting primarily with language deficits were 
excluded. 
The performance of bvFTD patients was compared with that of 30 healthy matched 
control subjects without a history of psychiatric or neurological diseases (Table 1). 
All participants provided written informed consent in agreement with the Helsinki 
declaration. The Ethics Committee of the Institute of Cognitive Neurology approved 
this study.  




General cognitive state (Mini-Mental State Examination, MMSE) and premorbid IQ 
(Word Accentuation Test) were assessed. See supplementary material S1. 
 
2.2.1. Empathy assessment 
 
The EPT evaluates empathy in the context of intentional and accidental harms (8, 16, 
17) and consists of 25 animated scenarios (11 intentional, 11 accidental, 3 neutral) 
involving two individuals. Each scenario consists of 3 digital color pictures presented 
in a successive manner to imply motion. The durations of the first, second, and third 
pictures in each animation were 500, 200, and 1000 ms, respectively (Figure 1, Video 
1). The three following types of situations were depicted: intentional harm in which 
one person is in a painful situation intentionally caused by another, (e.g., purposely 
stepping on someone’s toe); accidental harm where one person is in a painful situation 
accidentally caused by another; and control or neutral situations (e.g., one person 
receiving a flower given by another).  
 
Importantly, the faces and emotional reactions of the protagonists are not visible to 
the participants. We measured the reaction times (RTs) to situation comprehension 
(“press the button as soon as you understand the situation”). Furthermore, participants 
were asked to respond 6 questions: (1) cognitive aspects of empathy: intentionality 
(the accidental or deliberate nature of the action) and intention of the perpetrator to 
hurt the victim (how bad was the purpose?); (2) affective aspects: emphatic concern 
(how sad do you feel for the victim?) and degree of discomfort (for the victim); and 
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(3) moral evaluation aspects: correctness of the action and punishment (how much 
penalty does this action deserve?). Each question was answered using a computer-
based visual analogue scale (Figure 1, Video 1). Ratings and RTs for each question 
were measured. 
 
Before testing, all participants performed a training session consisting in a shorter 
version of the task with similar situations to ensure the correct understanding of the 
instructions. 
 
2.2.2. OSCD  
 
The OSCD assessment included: A) The Awareness of Social Inference Test 
(TASIT), which is used to assess emotion recognition and can detect subtle deficits in 
bvFTD (25); B) the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), a ToM task sensitive 
for bvFTD impairments (21); and C) the Social Norms Questionnaire (SNQ), an 
instrument employed in the assessment of bvFTD patients (6). Before each test, 
participants performed training trials to make sure that the instructions were 




The EF battery included the INECO frontal screening (IFS) (26), and measures of 
verbal fluency, inhibitory control, speed processing, working memory and cognitive 
flexibility. See S1. 
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2.3. Data Analysis  
 
ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD post hoc test (when appropriate) were used to analyze 
differences among groups. To control for general cognitive state on performance, we 
applied ANCOVA tests adjusted for the MMSE scores (reporting only effects that 
were still significant after covarying). To determine whether empathy deficits were 
related to EF or OSCD, the empathy results were re-analyzed using the total scores of 
all measures of OSCD and EF independently as covariates (see (21) for a similar 
approach). These analyses were conducted separately. Finally, we conducted multiple 
regression analyses to explore whether empathy performance was partially explained 
by specific impairments in EF or OSCD. The empathy measures that were still 
significantly different between groups after any of the covariance analyses were 
separately considered as dependent variables. We estimated two different models in 
which the empathy measures that were still significantly different between groups 
after any of the covariance analyses were considered as dependent variables. The first 
model included a global score of intentionality (the mean of the three conditions) as 
dependent variable; the second one considered as dependent variable a score of 
empathic concern defined by the subtraction of neutral situations from the intentional 
ones. The group, the gender, a global score of OSCD (mean accuracy on TASIT and 










3.1. Demographic data and general cognitive state 
 
Groups were matched by age (F(1,65)=0.10, p=0.74), gender (X
2
(1)=0.59, p=0.44), 
education (F(1,65)=0.97, p=0.32) and premorbid IQ (F(1,65)=1.54, p=0.21). As 
expected, bvFTD patients showed lower MMSE performance than controls 
(F(1,65)=11.55, p<0.01) (Table 1). 
 
3.2. Empathy  
 
Results are summarized in Figure 2. 
 
Cognitive components. Significant differences between groups (F(2,120)=3.15, 
p<0.05) were observed in intentionality judgments. Post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s HSD, 
MS=464.81, df =179.92) revealed that bvFTD patients (hereafter referred to as 
patients) had significantly lower comprehension of the intentionality of accidental 
(p<0.01) situations compared to controls. Furthermore, differences between groups 
were observed in ratings of intention to hurt (F(2,120)=16.44, p< 0.01). Post-hoc 
analysis (Tukey HSD, MS=10.29, df=23.72) showed that patients had higher ratings 
than controls for neutral (p<0.05) and accidental (p<0.01) situations. 
 
Affective components. The empathic concern ratings were significantly different 
between groups (F(2,120)=10.02, p<0.01). Post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, 
MS=10.69, df=155.04) revealed that patients rated intentional pain situations lower 
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(p<0.05) than controls. Furthermore, controls showed higher empathic concern for 
intentional than accidental pain situations (p<0.01). This difference was not observed 
in patients (p=0.78).  
 
Moral components. Significant differences were found in correctness ratings 
(F(2,120)=513, p<0.01). Post-hoc analysis (Tukey HSD, MS=9.62, df=170.63) 
showed that patients rated neutral situations as more incorrect than controls (p<0.01). 
Between groups, differences (F(2,120)=6.24, p<0.01) were also found in punishment. 
Post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s HSD, MS =11.21, df=127.24) showed that patients rated 
neutral (p<0.01) situations higher than controls.  
 
No RTs differences were observed between groups.  
 
3.3. Social cognition and EF 
 
The OSCD and EF results are shown in Table 1 (see details in supplementary material 
S2). Regarding social cognition, patients showed lower performance on TASIT (as 
well as scores of sadness, fear and disgust recognition) and RMET scores than 
controls. No group differences were observed in SNQ scores. Regarding EF, patients 
showed a lower performance than controls on the IFS total score, cognitive flexibility, 
the Hayling test and the verbal phonological fluency task. 
 
3.4. Re-analysis of empathy data with social cognition measures as covariates 
Group differences in the intentionality comprehension (accidental pain situations) 
remained significant after adjusting for OSCD (F(1,65) = 5.72, p < 0 .05). Similarly, 
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group differences in empathic concern for intentional pain situation were preserved 
(F(1,65) = 6.98, p < 0 .05). Nonetheless, differences in intention to hurt ratings for 
neutral (F(1,65) = 0.95, p = 0.33) and accidental situations (F(1,65) = 4.00, p = 0.06) 
were not preserved after co-varying. Differences between groups in correctness 
(F(1,65) = 2.03, p = 0.15) and punishment (F(1,65) = 2.63, p = 0.11) ratings for 
neutral situations also disappeared. See figure 2A and C.  
 
3.5. Re-analysis of empathy data with EF as covariates 
Group differences in the intentionality comprehension did not remain significant after 
adjusting for EF (F(1,65) = 2.24, p = 0 .14). A significant effect of the Hayling test 
performance on accidental situations comprehension was also observed (F(1,65) = 
6.47, p < 0 .05).  
 
Significant group differences in empathic concern ratings for intentional pain situation 
were preserved (F(1,65) = 16.53, p < 0 .01) after covariate analysis (Figure 2C). 
However, differences in intention to hurt ratings for neutral (F(1,65) = 0.01, p = 0.89) 
and accidental situations (F(1,65) = 1.07, p = 0.30) were not preserved after co-
varying, as well as correctness (F(1,65) = 0.12, p = 0.72) and punishment (F(1,65) = 
0.047, p = 0.82) ratings for neutral situations. 
 
3.6. Is the empathy performance partially explained by EF, OSCD or general 
cognitive state?  
 
Figure 3 shows associations in multiple regression analyses indexing the role of EF 
and OSCD. A first model including the intentionality score as dependent variable 
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(F(1,65) = 8.59, p < 0.01) showed that EF (beta = 0.28) and group (beta = -0.29) 
predicted the intentionality comprehension, explaining 38% of the variance. We 
carried out a second model with empathic concern as dependent variable (subtraction 
of neutral situations from the intentional ones). This model (F(1, 65) = 5.02, p < 0.01) 
evidenced that group (but not EF or OSCD) was the only predictor (beta = -4.14) 
associated with empathic concern ratings, explaining 26% of the variance.  
 
To confirm this last result, we estimated three different multiple regression models 
considering empathic concern as dependent variable and including sequentially all the 
EF and OSCD covariables. The first model including all EF variables showed that 
none of them were significantly associated (F(1, 65) = 0.54, p = 0.73). The second 
model including all OSCD variables (F(1, 65)=0.14, p=0.93) evidenced no significant 
associations. The third model included all EF and OSCD variables confirmed that 
none of these measures were significantly associated with empathic concern (F(1, 
65)=0.23, p=0.96) (see Table 2). 
 
In brief, EF predicted the intentionality comprehension but not the empathic concern. 
Social cognition was not associated with any of the dependent variables. Empathic 
concern was not explained by any predictor.  
To explore whether empathic concern depends on the general cognitive state or 
disease severity, we also compared the performance of patients with high (54%) and 
low (46%) MMSE scores (cut-off=27). No group differences in empathic concern (t 
(35)=0.80, p=0.42) were found, suggesting an early and primary involvement.  
 
 
13 Baez et al. 
 
4. Discussion  
 
Although empathy deficits are considered a central feature and diagnostic criterion of 
bvFTD, no studies had directly explored the contribution of different empathy aspects 
and whether and how factors such as EF and social cognition affect the empathic 
abilities in these patients. Our results replicate previous findings of EF (21, 26) and 
social cognition (6, 22) impairments in bvFTD (except for the lack of differences in 
SNQ scores (6), that would be explained by population's cultural differences). 
Moreover, we provide evidence of a primary deficit in empathic concern that is not 
explained by deficits in EF or OSCD. The identification and further assessment of the 
primary empathy deficits of bvFTD patients may be useful in the establishment of 
behavioral patterns and potentially in predicting the disease progression based on 
empathic concern levels. 
 
4.1. Differential impairments of empathy components 
 
Impaired cognitive components (distinguishing accidental from neutral and 
intentional situations) were observed in patients. This is expected because empathy is 
a contextual phenomenon affected by stimulus ambiguity (27). Contextual cues help 
to bias the intrinsic meaning of ambiguous targets (28), particularly regarding others 
in pain (27). Accidental pain situations are less clear and explicit and increase the 
level of ambiguity and the demands in the attribution of the action's intentionality. 
Patients with bvFTD have deficits in inferring the intentionality of others’ actions (7, 
21, 29), and in understanding ambiguous emotional scenes (30). Furthermore, results 
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are consistent with the current view that these patients have deficits in processing 
contextual social cues (23, 24).  
 
Patients rated the intention to hurt for neutral/accidental situations higher than 
controls. In contrast, empathic ratings of healthy participants (8, 15) are greater for 
intentional than for accidental pain situations. Intentionality detection is a decisive 
step in determining whether an action was malicious (8). The inability to infer the 
intentions of others’ actions may affect the intention to hurt ratings. Patients with 
bvFTD tend to overattribute bad intentions to the agent (7, 31), even if the action was 
unintentional.   
 
Regarding affective components, bvFTD patients showed lower empathic concern 
ratings for intentional pain situations. Previous bvFTD studies (3, 5, 12) have reported 
diminished levels of empathic concern as rated by relatives or caregivers. Thus, this 
characteristic appears to be a core component of bvFTD empathy impairments (see 
below).  
 
On moral components, patients rated neutral situations more morally wrong than 
controls. However, neutral situations did not represent a wrong action. Again, these 
findings suggest deficits in inferring the intentionality of the action and in attributing 
bad intention even when this was not the purpose. Moral reasoning relies on both 
affective and cognitive processes to integrate intentions and action consequences (8). 
In agreement with previous reports (4, 5, 32), our results suggest that moral reasoning 
is impaired in bvFTD.  
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Overall, the empathy profile of patients was characterized by impairments in 
cognitive, affective and moral components. Deficits in the ability to infer the 
intentionality of another's actions seem to affect cognitive and moral components. 
Empathic concern was the only component primarily affected in bvFTD.  
 
4.2. Are empathy deficits explained by EF or OSCD?  
 
Impairments in the cognitive components of bvFTD patients remained significant 
after adjusting for social cognition but disappeared after co-varying for EF. Working 
memory, selective attention and inhibitory control (13, 18, 19) are particularly 
associated with cognitive empathy. Specifically, inferring the intentionality of an 
action requires the inhibition of one’s own perspective and the simultaneous appraisal 
of contextual cues (13). During EPT, accidental pain situations are less clear and 
explicit. Therefore, it is possible that the accurate recognition of these situations 
requires a higher EF demand.   
 
Similarly, the significance of intention to hurt and correctness/punishment ratings also 
disappeared after co-varying for EF. These three empathy aspects are strongly 
dependent on the observer’s interpretation of intention, and the EF profile seems to 
explain these deficits. In bvFTD (5, 12), a relationship between cognitive components 
(rated by caregivers) and EF has been evidenced. The same group differences also 
disappeared after co-varying for social cognition, consistent with the fact that 
empathy depends on emotion recognition (18, 33) and ToM (19, 34). Moreover, the 
deficits in moral components in bvFTD patients may be partially explained by an 
empathic loss in emotionally identifying with others (32). Thus, emotion recognition 
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and ToM deficits account for the abnormalities in cognitive and moral components of 
empathy observed in patients with bvFTD. 
 
Differences in empathic concern for intentional situations remained significant after 
co-varying for EF and OSCD. These results suggest that bvFTD patients have a core 
deficit in other-oriented emotional reactions to the misfortune of others. We 
performed multiple regressions to further explore which empathy aspects were 
primary affected. We choose a global score of the OSCD from TASIT and RMET 
because in this and previous studies (21, 25) detected bvFTD impairments. The IFS 
was also selected as a predictor because this tool includes several EF subtests and 
detects bvFTD executive dysfunction (26). Multiple regression results showed that 
empathic concern was not predicted by EF or OSCD.  
 
4.3. Emphatic concern as the primary affectation of bvFTD 
 
Taken together, our results suggest that empathic concern is the only component 
primarily affected in bvFTD that is neither related nor explained by EF/OSCD deficits 
or the general cognitive status. In contrast, deficits in cognitive and moral aspects of 
empathy seem to depend on other processes such as EF, emotion recognition or ToM.  
  
The degree of discomfort (an affective component) was preserved in patients. Unlike 
empathic concern, the discomfort degree involves self-oriented feelings of personal 
unease when exposed to the suffering of others (35). Moreover, discomfort may 
produce an egoistic motivation to reduce one’s own personal distress, whereas 
empathic concern may instigate an altruistic motivation to help the other. Thus, the 
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other-oriented emotional response that produces a motivational state to increase the 
other’s welfare was intrinsically affected in bvFTD, constituting the core of empathy 
impairments observed in these patients. 
 
Theoretical approaches (9) and empirical evidence (3) agree that empathy relies on 
dissociable affective and cognitive components. Emotional components of empathy 
are foundational, while cognitive components are more complex and may depend 
upon other abilities (3). Thus, diminished other-oriented emotional responses may be 
sufficient to produce the daily empathy impairments observed in bvFTD patients.  
 
Neuroimaging studies of empathy (3, 36) highlight a network that includes the 
inferior and medial frontal cortex, amygdala, right somatosensory cortex, right 
temporal pole and insula; all brain areas usually affected in bvFTD (37-39). The brain 
atrophy pattern in bvFTD is consistent with the primary deficit in empathic concern 
observed in this study. Our findings open new pathways to investigate whether 
impairments in empathic concern could predict the atrophy pattern, behavioral 
changes, and the clinical profile of bvFTD. Although this is the first study in 
evidencing the empathic concern deficits usually reported by bvFTD relatives by 
means of a experimental method, our patients were investigated only with routine 
MRI recordings. Further volumetric and fMRI studies may provide additional insights 
about the relationship among the location of atrophy and the associated pattern of 
empathy impairments. 
 
From a clinical perspective, given that adequate empathic functioning is an important 
element of higher social functioning (13), such an impairment should be considered in 
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the assessment and treatment of  bvFTD. Furthermore, one of the strengths of the 
current study is its reliance on an ecological design that is more appropriate than self-
report questionnaires. It is well-known that even frontal patients are impaired in their 
everyday lives. It is difficult to detect impairments with traditional tests because 
standard and decontextualized neuropsychological assessments introduce sufficient 
external structure to suppress some behavioral tendencies (40). Remarkably, the task 
employed here detected experimentally (5, 12). The convergence between 
observations in experimental, clinical and everyday life highlight the importance of 
considering empathic concern impairments as a core symptom of bvFTD. These 
results emphasize the value of using tasks involving real-life social scenarios (21, 23) 
as evidenced by their greater sensitivity in the assessment of neuropsychiatric 
populations. A more subtle understanding of these complex cognitive deficits in 
bvFTD will improve assessment in the clinical setting and may allow for the 
development of rational cognitive stimulation strategies. 
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Figure 1. (A) Examples of the visual stimuli used for each category. The durations 
of the first, second, and third picture were 1000 ms, 200 ms, and 1000 ms, 
respectively. (B) Examples of the questions designed to assess different empathy 
aspects. Each question was answered using a computer-based visual analogue scale. 
 
Figure 2. Performance in the empathy for pain task and significant differences 
between groups. Differences that were statistically significant are indicated by * 
(before co-varying), ** (after co-varying by social cognition measures), and *** (after 
co-varying by EF). (A) Intentionality judgments. NS=neutral situations, 
IPS=intentional pain situations, APS=accidental pain situations. (B) Empathy ratings 
for neutral situations. (C) Empathy ratings for intentional pain situations. The 
highlighted region shows empathic concern as the only difference that remained 
significant after covariate adjustment for social cognition (F(1,65) = 6.98, p < 0 .05) 
or executive functions (F(1,65) = 16.53, p < 0 .01). (D) Empathy ratings for 
accidental pain situations. IH=intention to hurt, EC=empathic concern, D=discomfort, 
C=correctness, P=punishment.  
 
Figure 3. Multiple regression analyses. (A) Regression analysis using intentionality 
comprehension as the dependent variable. Executive functions significantly predicted 
the intentionality comprehension. (B) Regression analysis using empathic concern as 
the dependent variable. No significant associations were observed between empathic 
concern and social cognition or executive functions. 
